Merge "Revert "Move seccomp policy logic to bionic""

This commit is contained in:
Paul Lawrence
2017-02-27 16:39:11 +00:00
committed by Gerrit Code Review

View File

@@ -14,11 +14,128 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "JNIHelp.h"
#include "core_jni_helpers.h"
#include "JniConstants.h"
#include "utils/Log.h"
#include "utils/misc.h"
#if defined __arm__ || defined __aarch64__
#include <vector>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include "seccomp_policy.h"
#define syscall_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
#define arch_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))
typedef std::vector<sock_filter> filter;
// We want to keep the below inline functions for debugging and future
// development even though they are not all sed currently.
#pragma clang diagnostic push
#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-function"
static inline void Kill(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL));
}
static inline void Trap(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP));
}
static inline void Error(filter& f, __u16 retcode) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO + retcode));
}
inline static void Trace(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE));
}
inline static void Allow(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW));
}
#pragma clang diagnostic pop
inline static void ExamineSyscall(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_nr));
}
inline static int SetValidateArchitectureJumpTarget(size_t offset, filter& f) {
size_t jump_length = f.size() - offset - 1;
auto u8_jump_length = (__u8) jump_length;
if (u8_jump_length != jump_length) {
ALOGE("Can't set jump greater than 255 - actual jump is %zu",
jump_length);
return -1;
}
f[offset] = BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_ARM, u8_jump_length, 0);
return 0;
}
inline static size_t ValidateArchitectureAndJumpIfNeeded(filter& f) {
f.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, arch_nr));
f.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 2, 0));
f.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_ARM, 1, 0));
Trap(f);
return f.size() - 2;
}
static bool install_filter(filter const& f) {
struct sock_fprog prog = {
(unsigned short) f.size(),
(struct sock_filter*) &f[0],
};
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) < 0) {
ALOGE("SECCOMP: Could not set seccomp filter of size %zu: %s", f.size(), strerror(errno));
return false;
}
ALOGI("SECCOMP: Global filter of size %zu installed", f.size());
return true;
}
bool set_seccomp_filter() {
filter f;
// Note that for mixed 64/32 bit architectures, ValidateArchitecture inserts a
// jump that must be changed to point to the start of the 32-bit policy
// 32 bit syscalls will not hit the policy between here and the call to SetJump
auto offset_to_32bit_filter =
ValidateArchitectureAndJumpIfNeeded(f);
// 64-bit filter
ExamineSyscall(f);
// arm64-only filter - autogenerated from bionic syscall usage
for (size_t i = 0; i < arm64_filter_size; ++i)
f.push_back(arm64_filter[i]);
Trap(f);
if (SetValidateArchitectureJumpTarget(offset_to_32bit_filter, f) != 0)
return -1;
// 32-bit filter
ExamineSyscall(f);
// arm32 filter - autogenerated from bionic syscall usage
for (size_t i = 0; i < arm_filter_size; ++i)
f.push_back(arm_filter[i]);
Trap(f);
return install_filter(f);
}
static void Seccomp_setPolicy(JNIEnv* /*env*/) {
if (!set_seccomp_filter()) {
ALOGE("Failed to set seccomp policy - killing");
@@ -26,6 +143,13 @@ static void Seccomp_setPolicy(JNIEnv* /*env*/) {
}
}
#else // #if defined __arm__ || defined __aarch64__
static void Seccomp_setPolicy(JNIEnv* /*env*/) {
}
#endif
static const JNINativeMethod method_table[] = {
NATIVE_METHOD(Seccomp, setPolicy, "()V"),
};