Rather than use the raw Intent, we make a copy of it. See bug.
Bug: 330722900
Flag: EXEMPT bugfix
Test: manual
Test: atest com.android.settings.users.UserSettingsTest
com.android.settings.users.UserDetailsSettingsTest
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:1189e24e47571eae86634aeaa7dc60b8fe7f4820)
Merged-In: Id74e4b7ae261f2916eedaef04a679f83409a4b67
Change-Id: Id74e4b7ae261f2916eedaef04a679f83409a4b67
Before the setup flow completion, don't allow the app info page in App battery usage to be launched.
Bug: 327748846
Test: atest SettingsRoboTests + manual test
- factory reset + launch app battery usage app info via ADB during Setup -> verify app closes
Flag : EXEMPT bugfix
Change-Id: I486820ca2afecc02729a56a3c531fb931c1907d0
Merged-In: I486820ca2afecc02729a56a3c531fb931c1907d0
(cherry picked from commit 419a6a9079)
Before the setup flow completion, don't allow the app info page in App battery usage to be launched.
Bug: 327748846
Test: atest SettingsRoboTests + manual test
- factory reset + launch app battery usage app info via ADB during Setup -> verify app closes
Flag : EXEMPT bugfix
Change-Id: I486820ca2afecc02729a56a3c531fb931c1907d0
Merged-In: I486820ca2afecc02729a56a3c531fb931c1907d0
(cherry picked from commit 419a6a9079)
getLaunchedFromPackage() reports who launched this Activity or built
PendingIntent used to launch it, whereas getCallingActivity() reports
who will get result of Activity.
Bug: 316891059
Bug: 333364513
Test: robotest, manual
Change-Id: If97018c2741caef622f0596bbfeaa42ef1788b78
(cherry picked from commit ddc11bc03a)
Add checks URIs for content from other users.
Fail for users that are not profiles of the current user.
Test: atest DefaultRingtonePreferenceTest
Bug: 299614635
Change-Id: Ib266b285a3a1c6c5265ae2321159e61e08e349f6
Merged-In: Ib266b285a3a1c6c5265ae2321159e61e08e349f6
When LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential() fails, it can either return
false or throw an exception. Catch the exception and treat it the same
way as a false return value, to prevent crashing com.android.settings.
Bug: 253043065
Test: Tried setting lockscreen credential while in secure FRP mode using
smartlock setup activity launched by intent via adb. Verified
that com.android.settings no longer crashes due to the exception
from LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential().
Change-Id: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
(cherry picked from commit 05f1eff1c9)
(moved change into ChooseLockPassword.java and ChooseLockPattern.java,
which are merged into SaveAndFinishWorker.java on udc-qpr-dev and main)
Merged-In: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
When LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential() fails, it can either return
false or throw an exception. Catch the exception and treat it the same
way as a false return value, to prevent crashing com.android.settings.
Bug: 253043065
Test: Tried setting lockscreen credential while in secure FRP mode using
smartlock setup activity launched by intent via adb. Verified
that com.android.settings no longer crashes due to the exception
from LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential().
Change-Id: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
(cherry picked from commit 05f1eff1c9)
(moved change into ChooseLockPassword.java and ChooseLockPattern.java,
which are merged into SaveAndFinishWorker.java on udc-qpr-dev and main)
Merged-In: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
When LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential() fails, it can either return
false or throw an exception. Catch the exception and treat it the same
way as a false return value, to prevent crashing com.android.settings.
Bug: 253043065
Test: Tried setting lockscreen credential while in secure FRP mode using
smartlock setup activity launched by intent via adb. Verified
that com.android.settings no longer crashes due to the exception
from LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential().
Change-Id: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
(cherry picked from commit 05f1eff1c9)
(moved change into ChooseLockPassword.java and ChooseLockPattern.java,
which are merged into SaveAndFinishWorker.java on udc-qpr-dev and main)
Merged-In: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
When LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential() fails, it can either return
false or throw an exception. Catch the exception and treat it the same
way as a false return value, to prevent crashing com.android.settings.
Bug: 253043065
Test: Tried setting lockscreen credential while in secure FRP mode using
smartlock setup activity launched by intent via adb. Verified
that com.android.settings no longer crashes due to the exception
from LockPatternUtils#setLockCredential().
Change-Id: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
(cherry picked from commit 05f1eff1c9)
(moved change into ChooseLockPassword.java and ChooseLockPattern.java,
which are merged into SaveAndFinishWorker.java on udc-qpr-dev and main)
Merged-In: I48b9119c19fb6378b1f88d36433ee4f4c8501d76
- Finish ApnEditor settings if user is not an admin
- Finish ApnEditor settings if user has DISALLOW_CONFIG_MOBILE_NETWORKS restriction
Bug: 279902472
Test: manual test
make RunSettingsRoboTests ROBOTEST_FILTER=ApnEditorTest
Change-Id: Iecdbbff7e21dfb11e3ba385858747a220cfd3e04
- Finish ApnEditor settings if user is not an admin
- Finish ApnEditor settings if user has DISALLOW_CONFIG_MOBILE_NETWORKS restriction
Bug: 279902472
Test: manual test
atest -c ApnEditorTest
Change-Id: Iecdbbff7e21dfb11e3ba385858747a220cfd3e04
* NotificationAccessConfirmationActivity (triggered through CompanionDeviceManager) -> Don't show the dialog, bail out early similarly to other invalid inputs.
* NotificationAccessSettings (from Special App Access) -> No changes, but use the canonical constant now.
* ApprovalPreferenceController (used in NotificationAccessDetails) -> Disable the toggle, unless the NLS was previously approved (in which case it can still be removed).
Fixes: 260570119
Fixes: 286043036
Test: atest + manually
Change-Id: Ifc048311746c027e3683cdcf65f1079d04cf7c56
Merged-In: Ifc048311746c027e3683cdcf65f1079d04cf7c56
* NotificationAccessConfirmationActivity (triggered through CompanionDeviceManager) -> Don't show the dialog, bail out early similarly to other invalid inputs.
* NotificationAccessSettings (from Special App Access) -> No changes, but use the canonical constant now.
* NotificationAccessDetails -> Disable the toggle, unless the NLS was previously approved (in which case it can still be removed).
Fixes: 260570119
Fixes: 286043036
Test: atest + manually
Change-Id: Ifc048311746c027e3683cdcf65f1079d04cf7c56
Merged-In: Ifc048311746c027e3683cdcf65f1079d04cf7c56
Currently selected IME can inject KeyEvent on DeviceAdminAdd screen to
activate itself as device admin and cause various DoS attacks.
This CL ensures KeyEvent on "Activate" button can only come from system
apps.
Bug: 280793427
Test: atest DeviceAdminActivationTest
Change-Id: I6470d1684d707f4b1e86f8b456be0b4e0af5f188
(cherry picked from commit 70a501d02e)
Currently selected IME can inject KeyEvent on DeviceAdminAdd screen to
activate itself as device admin and cause various DoS attacks.
This CL ensures KeyEvent on "Activate" button can only come from system
apps.
Bug: 280793427
Test: atest DeviceAdminActivationTest
Change-Id: I6470d1684d707f4b1e86f8b456be0b4e0af5f188
(cherry picked from commit 70a501d02e)
Note that an NLS that shouldn't be approvable (because its name is too long) but was already approved (either before the max length check was introduced, or through other means) will disappear from the list if the user revokes its access. This might be somewhat confusing, but since this is a very-edge case already it's fine.
Bug: 282932362
Test: manual
Change-Id: I4c9faea68e6d16b1a4ec7f472b5433cac1704c06
Note that an NLS that shouldn't be approvable (because its name is too long) but was already approved (either before the max length check was introduced, or through other means) will disappear from the list if the user revokes its access. This might be somewhat confusing, but since this is a very-edge case already it's fine.
Bug: 282932362
Test: manual
Change-Id: Iccfe7b53d643d6c9f9516f91d3cee3309b11551e
Currently selected IME can inject KeyEvent on DeviceAdminAdd screen to
activate itself as device admin and cause various DoS attacks.
This CL ensures KeyEvent on "Activate" button can only come from system
apps.
Bug: 280793427
Test: atest DeviceAdminActivationTest
Change-Id: I6470d1684d707f4b1e86f8b456be0b4e0af5f188
(cherry picked from commit 70a501d02e)
Currently selected IME can inject KeyEvent on DeviceAdminAdd screen to
activate itself as device admin and cause various DoS attacks.
This CL ensures KeyEvent on "Activate" button can only come from system
apps.
Bug: 280793427
Test: atest DeviceAdminActivationTest
Change-Id: I6470d1684d707f4b1e86f8b456be0b4e0af5f188
(cherry picked from commit 70a501d02e)
