Introduces an API to drop input events on this SurfaceControl. This
policy will be inherited by its children. The caller must hold the
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER permission.
Options include:
ALL: SurfaceControl and its children will not receive any
input regardless of whether it has a valid input channel.
These policies are used to enable features that allow for a less trusted
interaction model between apps. See the bug for more details.
Note: this backport doesn't include the oclude mode since its not
needed for the security fix.
Test: atest libgui_test InputDispatcherDropInputFeatureTest
Bug: 197296414
Merged-In: Ifcb4133306a43874e74e8fb0f42b60842daf6f25
Change-Id: Ifcb4133306a43874e74e8fb0f42b60842daf6f25
When switching users and attempting to lock the device, the sysui main
thread becomes overwhelmed with events, creating a significant lag
between the time a message is posted and processed on the main
thread. This can be dangerous when these events are critical for
security, such as calls coming from PhoneWindowManager#lockNow() that
call KeyguardViewMediator#doKeyguardTimeout(). On older devices with
slower CPUs and less memory, the delay in processing can be
significant (15 - 30s).
The result of not prioritizing these events leads to a window of time
where a guest user can switch back to the owner, and gain access to
the owner's homescreen without needing to unlock the device with the
owner's credentials.
As a mitigation, prioritize two events originating in two specific
methods to make sure the device locks as soon as possible as well as
have the system server preemptively update its local cache.
Bug: 151095871
Test: Very manual race condition - follow steps listed in bug
Change-Id: I7585a0a5eeb308e0e32a4f77f581556d883b5cda
Merged-In: I7585a0a5eeb308e0e32a4f77f581556d883b5cda
(cherry picked from commit 28c53ab8bc)
A malicious application could overlay the activity. The overlay is
able to be tapped through, which can trick the user into starting a
harmful activity.
The CL added the flag SYSTEM_FLAG_HIDE_NON_SYSTEM_OVERLAY_WINDOWS for
the activity to prevent the tapjacking/overlay attack.
Bug: 205595291
Test: atest CtsHarmfulAppWarningHostTestCases
Change-Id: Ia1a1ae0dc451e04bf5c31e3cb8cf30a0d8e32991
(cherry picked from commit a04b3666b8)
This reverts commit fa9c73975e.
Reason for revert: will deliver a better fix for that, ag/16580245.
Change-Id: I567f20b4f545bed906938731c27eac6eb7aeddff
The size of the input of both setStream and setResource may very big
that system server got oom while handling it, so we try to decode it
first before copying it to the wallpaper path, if the decoding fails, we
treat the input as an invalid input.
Bug: 204087139
Test: Manually set wallpaper, no PDoS observed.
Change-Id: I014cf461954992782b3dfa0dde67c98a572cc770
If a profile owner is defined for a specific user, do not delete usage
stats for a package on package deletion.
Bug: 197399948
Test: atest UsageStatsTest [all]
Change-Id: I94a8e3dfca8ef4c7616f77944d61726e06043b85
Merged-In: I94a8e3dfca8ef4c7616f77944d61726e06043b85
- Exposes a method to set that a certain part of the SF hierarchy is
trusted, and sets this state for tasks in PIP.
Bug: 191529039
Bug: 196389741
Test: Manual, try using permission dialog while PIP is active
Change-Id: I170cb5a7d22ef569eb36de21cc0bcbef60dd385e
Merged-In: I170cb5a7d22ef569eb36de21cc0bcbef60dd385e
Add private flag to WindowManager.LayoutParams. If the flag is set,
check if caller has INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW permission.
Bug: 155781676
Bug: 196389741
Test: atest WindowManagerServiceTests
Change-Id: I70151697cc01e8427129f951f0ebadc4805b2d56
Merged-In: I70151697cc01e8427129f951f0ebadc4805b2d56
Prevents non-system apps from placing a window over the app selection
screen.
Bug: 143559931
Test: Installed test app and attempted to overlay
Change-Id: Ied05088a5007e0f10cd3e1abd8d7da8ffeb3b674
Merged-In: Ied05088a5007e0f10cd3e1abd8d7da8ffeb3b674
(cherry picked from commit 34534e1fd2)
Prevents non-system apps from placing a window over the app selection
screen.
Bug: 143559931
Test: Installed test app and attempted to overlay
Change-Id: Ied05088a5007e0f10cd3e1abd8d7da8ffeb3b674
Merged-In: Ied05088a5007e0f10cd3e1abd8d7da8ffeb3b674
(cherry picked from commit 34534e1fd2)
See comment here for the discussion on solution
https://b.corp.google.com/issues/169762606#comment14
Change-Id: If212df3a3b7be1de0fb26b8e88b2fcbb8077c253
Bug: 169762606
(cherry picked from commit 11053c17b3)
Change-Id: Ic65162df3415275514f6277891a9412865e2315b
Merged-In: If212df3a3b7be1de0fb26b8e88b2fcbb8077c253
See comment here for the discussion on solution
https://b.corp.google.com/issues/169762606#comment14
Change-Id: If212df3a3b7be1de0fb26b8e88b2fcbb8077c253
Bug: 169762606
(cherry picked from commit 11053c17b3)
Change-Id: I3ff7d8f4df086cb4c153e7ec873b85a093810722
Merged-In: If212df3a3b7be1de0fb26b8e88b2fcbb8077c253
The system is overwhelmed by an enormous label string returned by
the load label api. This cl truncates the label string if it exceeds
the maximum safe length.
Bug: 67013844
Test: atest PackageManagerTest
Change-Id: Ia4d768cc93a47cfb8b6f7c4b6dc73abd801809bd
Merged-in: Ia4d768cc93a47cfb8b6f7c4b6dc73abd801809bd
