* changes:
[automerger] Update internal ViewPager's SavedState to match Support Library version am: 187964aca1
Update internal ViewPager's SavedState to match Support Library version
There was an asymmetry between parcelling and unparcelling of
VerifyCredentialResponse that could lead to type confusion if
packed with other objects in a Parcel.
Test: none
Bug: 71714464
Change-Id: Icff68879e249422ccca49f2bb7db85c35b4cb353
The WHATWG URL parsing algorithm [1] used by browsers says that for
"special" URL schemes (which is basically all commonly-used
hierarchical schemes, including http, https, ftp, and file), the host
portion ends if a \ character is seen, whereas this class previously
continued to consider characters part of the hostname. This meant
that a malicious URL could be seen as having a "safe" host when viewed
by an app but navigate to a different host when passed to a browser.
[1] https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#host-state
Bug: 71360761
Test: vogar frameworks/base/core/tests/coretests/src/android/net/UriTest.java (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Id53f7054d1be8d59bbcc7e219159e59a2425106e
When isDeviceLocked function is called in KeyguardManager, mTrustManager
can be null. To prevent NPE during this call, moved the mTrustManager
access to a synchronized getter.
Test: run cts -c android.print.cts.PageRangeAdjustmentTest -m testWantedPagesAlreadyWrittenForPreview
Test: run cts -c android.accessibilityservice.cts.AccessibilityEndToEndTest -m testTypeViewTextChangedAccessibilityEvent
Test: run cts -c com.android.cts.appsecurity.DocumentsTest -m testCreateExisting
Test: run cts -c com.android.cts.devicepolicy.ManagedProfileTest -m testCrossProfileCopyPaste
Test: run cts -c android.text.method.cts.PasswordTransformationMethodTest
Bug: 69471788
Change-Id: I4b4a0bb3b127424fecdad85ba559ce861af165e4
Malformed authority segments can currently cause the parser to produce
a hostname that doesn't match the hostname produced by the WHATWG URL
parsing algorithm* used by browsers, which means that a URL could be seen
as having a "safe" host when checked by an Android app but actually visit
a different host when passed to a browser. The WHATWG URL parsing
algorithm always produces a hostname based on the last @ in the authority
segment, so we do the same.
* https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#authority-state resets the "buffer", which
is being used to build up the host name, each time an @ is found, so it
has the effect of using the content between the final @ and the end
of the authority section as the hostname.
Bug: 68341964
Test: vogar android.net.UriTest (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Idca79f35a886de042c94d6ab66787c2e98ac8376
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
GateKeeperResponse has inconsistent writeToParcel() and
createFromParcel() methods, making it possible for a malicious app to
create a Bundle that changes contents after reserialization. Such
Bundles can be used to execute Intents with system privileges.
This CL changes writeToParcel() to make serialization and
deserialization consistent, thus fixing the issue.
Bug: 62998805
Test: use the debug app (see bug)
Change-Id: Ie1c64172c454c3a4b7a0919eb3454f0e38efcd09
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Please see commit 3082eb7c72 for an
explanation of this change.
This capability is not used by system_server.
Bug: 34951864
Bug: 38496951
Test: code compiles, device boots, no selinux errors ever reported.
Change-Id: I4242b1abaa8679b9bfa0d31a1df565b46b7b3cc3
(cherry picked from commit 35775783fc)
Commit https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/f0ce0eee added
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE as a capability check which would allow access to
sensitive /proc/PID files. system_server uses this capability to collect
smaps from managed processes. Presumably this was done to avoid the
implications of granting CAP_SYS_PTRACE to system_server.
However, with SELinux enforcement, we can grant CAP_SYS_PTRACE but not
allow ptrace attach() to other processes. The net result of this is that
CAP_SYS_PTRACE and CAP_SYS_RESOURCE have identical security controls, as
long as system_server:process ptrace is never granted.
Add CAP_SYS_PTRACE to the set of capabilities granted to system_server.
Don't delete CAP_SYS_RESOURCE for now. SELinux has blocked the use of
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, but we still want to generate audit logs if it's
triggered. CAP_SYS_RESOURCE can be deleted in a future commit.
Bug: 34951864
Bug: 38496951
Test: Device boots, functionality remains identical, no sys_resource
denials from system_server.
Change-Id: I2570266165396dba2b600eac7c42c94800d9c65b
(cherry picked from commit 3082eb7c72)
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
(Manual merge from commit 687bb44b43)
Change-Id: I7746c9175a2da28f75d4f4b169d7997abadf1852
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
Change-Id: I10f24747e3ab87d77cd1deba56db4526e3aa5441
(cherry picked from commit 687bb44b43)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
