The WHATWG URL parsing algorithm [1] used by browsers says that for
"special" URL schemes (which is basically all commonly-used
hierarchical schemes, including http, https, ftp, and file), the host
portion ends if a \ character is seen, whereas this class previously
continued to consider characters part of the hostname. This meant
that a malicious URL could be seen as having a "safe" host when viewed
by an app but navigate to a different host when passed to a browser.
[1] https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#host-state
Bug: 71360761
Test: vogar frameworks/base/core/tests/coretests/src/android/net/UriTest.java (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Id53f7054d1be8d59bbcc7e219159e59a2425106e
Malformed authority segments can currently cause the parser to produce
a hostname that doesn't match the hostname produced by the WHATWG URL
parsing algorithm* used by browsers, which means that a URL could be seen
as having a "safe" host when checked by an Android app but actually visit
a different host when passed to a browser. The WHATWG URL parsing
algorithm always produces a hostname based on the last @ in the authority
segment, so we do the same.
* https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#authority-state resets the "buffer", which
is being used to build up the host name, each time an @ is found, so it
has the effect of using the content between the final @ and the end
of the authority section as the hostname.
Bug: 68341964
Test: vogar android.net.UriTest (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Idca79f35a886de042c94d6ab66787c2e98ac8376
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
GateKeeperResponse has inconsistent writeToParcel() and
createFromParcel() methods, making it possible for a malicious app to
create a Bundle that changes contents after reserialization. Such
Bundles can be used to execute Intents with system privileges.
This CL changes writeToParcel() to make serialization and
deserialization consistent, thus fixing the issue.
Bug: 62998805
Test: use the debug app (see bug)
Change-Id: Ie1c64172c454c3a4b7a0919eb3454f0e38efcd09
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
(Manual merge from commit 687bb44b43)
Change-Id: I7746c9175a2da28f75d4f4b169d7997abadf1852
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
Change-Id: I10f24747e3ab87d77cd1deba56db4526e3aa5441
(cherry picked from commit 687bb44b43)
System server is no longer allowed to grant uri permission directly. As a result
we use grantUriPermissionFromIntent() to grant permission from the shell UID,
who is the owner of the bug report content.
Also fix a security bug where the broadcast to notify user consent of remote
bug report mismatches the <protected-broadcast> definition, causing it to be
sendable by anyone.
Bug: 34159108
Test: manual - Install TestDPC and request bugreport, try accept and decline
once the report is ready (Bullhead).
Merged-In: I66e3f2a16d4547549f09d3c96d52aed2330caedf
Change-Id: I66e3f2a16d4547549f09d3c96d52aed2330caedf
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
On FBE devices, don't save the metrics to disk but compute them when the
password is first entered and only store them in RAM.
Merged-in: 5daf273b7e
Bug: 32793550
Change-Id: Icee7f615167761177b224b342970a36c7d90f6ba
