The main looper needs to run freely for a moment after disabling
wifi in order for various signals (content observers, broadcast) to
propagate to all the listeners that need to take action for the
wifi stack to shut all the way down. This patch breaks up the
disable-and-rewrite-config sequence of wifi AP restore in to two
distinct operations separated by a moment so as not to block those
necessary messages.
Bug 22979342
Change-Id: I271766cad0e454669a194652fb67f835bb022cd1
We've seen case of it taking longer than 1500ms for the wifi system to
actually shut down after the triggering settings element is written,
so extend the wait time a bit. We've seen it take more than 1500ms
but not more than 2500ms, so that's the new heuristic.
This will of course all become happily obsolete once we start
applying restored AP definitions programmatically rather than by
filesystem-level operations.
Bug 22979342
Change-Id: I6acf1baac23d4100124093128b82abf242b11a0e
changes)
AppOpsManager:
Changed the default operating mode for WRITE_SETTINGS to MODE_DEFAULT from
MODE_ALLOWED.
packages/SettingsProvider:
We no longer do static permission checks for WRITE_SETTINGS in early checks and
defer that to app op when MODE_DEFAULT is returned. For some operations,
checking against WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS is sufficient.
ActivityManagerService & PowerManagerService:
Incorporated app op checks and handled the MODE_DEFAULT case.
provider/Settings:
Added helper function to do checks on whether app ops protected operations
can be performed by a caller. This includes checks for WRITE_SETTINGS and
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW.
Also added a public API (with javadocs) for apps to query if they can modify
system settings.
Changed the javadocs description for ACTION_MANAGE_WRITE_SETTINGS and
ACTION_MANAGE_OVERLAY_PERMISSION.
Added public API (with javadocs) for apps to query whether they can draw overlays or not,
and also javadocs description on how to use that check.
Change-Id: I7b651fe8af836c2074defdbd6acfec3f32acdbe9
In SettingsProvider, for settings that are cloned from the parent
to the profile:
When the parent value is changed, notify ContentObservers in the
profile as well.
BUG:21414456
Change-Id: Ie0560d1332174499d067db9978553843b640a161
Permission checks are enforced within the SettingsProvider specifically
for SECURE/SYSTEM/GLOBAL. Now WRITE_SETTINGS is runtime, so it shouldn't
apply to all the settings types.
Bug: 22044704
Change-Id: I9ed25d96b2fa4f46d3d049efa4300cd1d37bbd24
The system settings permission is going away and the user will
be able to choose which apps have access to system settings in
the UI. So, if an app is white-listed by the user or being on
the system image, we allow access to system settings. Also if
the caller has the stronger write secure settings permission
we allow changes of the less sensitive system settings.
Change-Id: I7aca958fd0ad2c588117b8c6e44d78eb16d648bc
Now a text value will be written to "value" but a binary value will be encoded
in base64 and stored in "valueBase64".
A null value will have neither value nor valueBase64.
Bug 20202004
Change-Id: I1eae936ff38e3460dc76ca20cc38f8d7e5ec6215
Passing null to XmlPullParser.setInput forces it to do additional
work, which can be easily avoided if we know the charset beforehand.
bug: b/20849543
Change-Id: Iaff97be9df2d0f99d7af8f19f65934439c9658e2
Legacy apps can write their own entries in the system settings and
when they get uninstalled these are hanging around forever polluting
the settings table. We keep track of which settings an app added and
when the app is uninstalled we drop its custom entries. The trouble
was that we did the same thing for global and secure settings with
no explicit list of platform defined settings. Hence, if say a test
signed by the platform certificate touches platform defined global
or secure settings and is then uninstalled, we would drop the platform
defined entries portentially crippling the system.
bug:20113160
Change-Id: Ia21694f6326ad4a1795c4666027b366e26c05a23
(cherry picked from commit b128540dc7)
When writing critical state to XML an excpetion can lead to creating
a malformed XML that is later parsed and may put the device in a bad
state. Hence, on any error while writing we should bail out and drop
the partially write state on the floor.
Corollary, any error on parsing can lead to having a partially read
state that is not consistent which may lead to writing this bad state
back to disk. Hence, on any error while parsing we should bail as
our current state may be unrecoverable.
Change-Id: Ia050c16198cb583f8a51263ad2035dbb948052b8
Will eventually be used by SystemUI and/or Settings.
Also fix SettingsProvider NPE.
Bug: 19993667, 19909433
Change-Id: Ie326849ac5f43ee35f728d9cc0e332b72292db70
The practice in the system server is to have lenient parsing code
to avoid the whole system being unusable due to a single XML error.
Change-Id: Idf44031edf5221966f3352ca2f83e284973ab95f
The restored set of enabled IMEs/subtypes is merged into the
current state of the system, rather than simply replacing it.
This is because we do not want to accidentally disable or
reconfigure something that the user is currently relying on.
There's a certain amount of repetitive activity here, rebuilding
the enabled-state data structures in a different format, but it's
important for maintainability that the restore code be able to
rely on the core InputMethodUtils implementation of reading/writing
the settings element.
Bug 19822542
Change-Id: If0104151b3526da6ecc669adde3119a239ecafeb
