Avoid potential race condition between FRP wipe and write operations
during factory reset by making the FRP partition unwritable after
wipe.
Bug: 30352311
Test: manual
Change-Id: If3f024a1611366c0677a996705724458094fcfad
(cherry picked from commit a629c772f4)
- move BroadcastReceiver info to developer guide. see cl/140402421
- add usage note to CONNECTIVITY_ACTION broadcast
bug:32533262
bug:33106411
Change-Id: Ic2aa517831d29418e0c42aa6fc1e7f9aeb50f802
MemoryIntArray was using the size of the undelying
ashmem region to mmap the data but the ashmem size
can be changed until the former is memory mapped.
Since we use the ashmem region size for boundary
checking and memory unmapping if it does not match
the size used while mapping an attacker can force
the system to unmap memory or to access undefined
memory and crash.
Also we were passing the memory address where the
ashmem region is mapped in the owner process to
support cases where the client can pass back the
MemoryIntArray instance. This allows an attacker
to put invalid address and cause arbitrary memory
to be freed.
Now we no longer support passing back the instance
to the owner process (the passed back instance is
read only), so no need to pass the memory adress
of the owner's mapping, thus not allowing freeing
arbitrary memory.
Further, we now check the memory mapped size against
the size of the underlying ashmem region after we do
the memory mapping (to fix the ahsmem size) and if
an attacker changed the size under us we throw.
Tests: Updated the tests and they pass.
bug:33039926
bug:33042690
Change-Id: Ibf56827209a9b791aa83ae679219baf829ffc2ac
MemoryIntArray was using the size of the undelying
ashmem region to mmap the data but the ashmem size
can be changed until the former is memory mapped.
Since we use the ashmem region size for boundary
checking and memory unmapping if it does not match
the size used while mapping an attacker can force
the system to unmap memory or to access undefined
memory and crash.
Also we were passing the memory address where the
ashmem region is mapped in the owner process to
support cases where the client can pass back the
MemoryIntArray instance. This allows an attacker
to put invalid address and cause arbitrary memory
to be freed.
Now we no longer support passing back the instance
to the owner process (the passed back instance is
read only), so no need to pass the memory adress
of the owner's mapping, thus not allowing freeing
arbitrary memory.
Further, we now check the memory mapped size against
the size of the underlying ashmem region after we do
the memory mapping (to fix the ahsmem size) and if
an attacker changed the size under us we throw.
Tests: Updated the tests and they pass.
bug:33039926
bug:33042690
Change-Id: I1004579181ff7a223ef659e85c46100c47ab2409
MemoryIntArray was using the size of the undelying
ashmem region to mmap the data but the ashmem size
can be changed until the former is memory mapped.
Since we use the ashmem region size for boundary
checking and memory unmapping if it does not match
the size used while mapping an attacker can force
the system to unmap memory or to access undefined
memory and crash.
Also we were passing the memory address where the
ashmem region is mapped in the owner process to
support cases where the client can pass back the
MemoryIntArray instance. This allows an attacker
to put invalid address and cause arbitrary memory
to be freed.
Now we no longer support passing back the instance
to the owner process (the passed back instance is
read only), so no need to pass the memory adress
of the owner's mapping, thus not allowing freeing
arbitrary memory.
Further, we now check the memory mapped size against
the size of the underlying ashmem region after we do
the memory mapping (to fix the ahsmem size) and if
an attacker changed the size under us we throw.
Tests: Updated the tests and they pass.
bug:33039926
bug:33042690
Change-Id: Id7f0e8a4c861b0b9fa796767e0c22d96633b14d1
MemoryIntArray was using the size of the undelying
ashmem region to mmap the data but the ashmem size
can be changed until the former is memory mapped.
Since we use the ashmem region size for boundary
checking and memory unmapping if it does not match
the size used while mapping an attacker can force
the system to unmap memory or to access undefined
memory and crash.
Also we were passing the memory address where the
ashmem region is mapped in the owner process to
support cases where the client can pass back the
MemoryIntArray instance. This allows an attacker
to put invalid address and cause arbitrary memory
to be freed.
Now we no longer support passing back the instance
to the owner process (the passed back instance is
read only), so no need to pass the memory adress
of the owner's mapping, thus not allowing freeing
arbitrary memory.
Further, we now check the memory mapped size against
the size of the underlying ashmem region after we do
the memory mapping (to fix the ahsmem size) and if
an attacker changed the size under us we throw.
Tests: Updated the tests and they pass.
bug:33039926
bug:33042690
Change-Id: Ie267646eb88014034fbd048d7a9bc273420c7eff
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
