The WHATWG URL parsing algorithm [1] used by browsers says that for
"special" URL schemes (which is basically all commonly-used
hierarchical schemes, including http, https, ftp, and file), the host
portion ends if a \ character is seen, whereas this class previously
continued to consider characters part of the hostname. This meant
that a malicious URL could be seen as having a "safe" host when viewed
by an app but navigate to a different host when passed to a browser.
[1] https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#host-state
Bug: 71360761
Test: vogar frameworks/base/core/tests/coretests/src/android/net/UriTest.java (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Id53f7054d1be8d59bbcc7e219159e59a2425106e
When isDeviceLocked function is called in KeyguardManager, mTrustManager
can be null. To prevent NPE during this call, moved the mTrustManager
access to a synchronized getter.
Test: run cts -c android.print.cts.PageRangeAdjustmentTest -m testWantedPagesAlreadyWrittenForPreview
Test: run cts -c android.accessibilityservice.cts.AccessibilityEndToEndTest -m testTypeViewTextChangedAccessibilityEvent
Test: run cts -c com.android.cts.appsecurity.DocumentsTest -m testCreateExisting
Test: run cts -c com.android.cts.devicepolicy.ManagedProfileTest -m testCrossProfileCopyPaste
Test: run cts -c android.text.method.cts.PasswordTransformationMethodTest
Bug: 69471788
Change-Id: I4b4a0bb3b127424fecdad85ba559ce861af165e4
Malformed authority segments can currently cause the parser to produce
a hostname that doesn't match the hostname produced by the WHATWG URL
parsing algorithm* used by browsers, which means that a URL could be seen
as having a "safe" host when checked by an Android app but actually visit
a different host when passed to a browser. The WHATWG URL parsing
algorithm always produces a hostname based on the last @ in the authority
segment, so we do the same.
* https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#authority-state resets the "buffer", which
is being used to build up the host name, each time an @ is found, so it
has the effect of using the content between the final @ and the end
of the authority section as the hostname.
Bug: 68341964
Test: vogar android.net.UriTest (on NYC branch)
Test: cts -m CtsNetTestCases (on NYC branch)
Change-Id: Idca79f35a886de042c94d6ab66787c2e98ac8376
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
GateKeeperResponse has inconsistent writeToParcel() and
createFromParcel() methods, making it possible for a malicious app to
create a Bundle that changes contents after reserialization. Such
Bundles can be used to execute Intents with system privileges.
This CL changes writeToParcel() to make serialization and
deserialization consistent, thus fixing the issue.
Bug: 62998805
Test: use the debug app (see bug)
Change-Id: Ie1c64172c454c3a4b7a0919eb3454f0e38efcd09
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Bug: 62196835
Test: Created an accessibility service that displays a system
and a toast overlay, confirmed that it disappeared when we
reached the accessibility permission screen that uses this
flag.
Change-Id: Ic51ead670fc480e549512ba1d02f49d9c13bc3f0
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
(Manual merge from commit 687bb44b43)
Change-Id: I7746c9175a2da28f75d4f4b169d7997abadf1852
Fix a bug where a malformed Parceled representation
of an AccessibilityNodeInfo could be used to mess with
Bundles as they get reparceled.
Bug: 36491278
Test: Verified that POC no longer works, a11y cts still passes.
Change-Id: I10f24747e3ab87d77cd1deba56db4526e3aa5441
(cherry picked from commit 687bb44b43)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
A recent security fix prevents the system UID from handing out Uri
permission grants directly from itself. Instead, services need to
issue grants as the original calling UID to ensure that the caller
actually has access to the Uris.
Test: builds, boots, send/recv MMS works in primary/secondary users
Bug: 33231106
Change-Id: Ia9fe19843b52977c8a94ee5349b907beda1882fc
(cherry picked from commit 7ff418d9a9)
Avoid potential race condition between FRP wipe and write operations
during factory reset by making the FRP partition unwritable after
wipe.
Bug: 30352311
Test: manual
Change-Id: If3f024a1611366c0677a996705724458094fcfad
(cherry picked from commit a629c772f4)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
As part of fixing a recent security issue, DownloadManager now needs
to issue Uri permission grants for all downloads. However, if an app
that requested a download is upgraded or otherwise force-stopped,
the required permission grants are removed.
We could tell DownloadManager about the app being stopped, but that
would be racy (due to background broadcast), and waking it up would
degrade system health. Instead, as a special case we now only
consider clearing DownloadManager permission grants when app data
is being cleared.
Bug: 32172542, 30537115
Test: builds, boots, app upgrade doesn't clear grants
Change-Id: I7e3d4546fd12bfe5f81b9fb9857ece58d574a6b9
(cherry picked from commit 23ec811266)
For an app to either send or receive content change notifications,
require that they have some level of access to the underlying
provider.
Without these checks, a malicious app could sniff sensitive user data
from the notifications of otherwise private providers.
Test: builds, boots, PoC app now fails
Bug: 32555637
Change-Id: If2dcd45cb0a9f1fb3b93e39fc7b8ae9c34c2fdef
For an app to either send or receive content change notifications,
require that they have some level of access to the underlying
provider.
Without these checks, a malicious app could sniff sensitive user data
from the notifications of otherwise private providers.
Test: builds, boots, PoC app now fails
Bug: 32555637
Change-Id: If2dcd45cb0a9f1fb3b93e39fc7b8ae9c34c2fdef
For an app to either send or receive content change notifications,
require that they have some level of access to the underlying
provider.
Without these checks, a malicious app could sniff sensitive user data
from the notifications of otherwise private providers.
Test: builds, boots, PoC app now fails
Bug: 32555637
Change-Id: If2dcd45cb0a9f1fb3b93e39fc7b8ae9c34c2fdef
For an app to either send or receive content change notifications,
require that they have some level of access to the underlying
provider.
Without these checks, a malicious app could sniff sensitive user data
from the notifications of otherwise private providers.
Test: builds, boots, PoC app now fails
Bug: 32555637
Change-Id: If2dcd45cb0a9f1fb3b93e39fc7b8ae9c34c2fdef
Added a service that listens whether emergency affordances
are necessary.
If the they are needed, it adds an option to the
global actions dialog that directly launches the
emergency call and also adds a long-press listener
to the keyguard emergency button.
Test: adb shell settings put global force_emergency_affordance 1 && adb shell settings put global emergency_affordance_number 111112
Bug: 30404490
Change-Id: Ib96a15da2ef4b568a8d77140ebca6aa6f20f5ddb
Added a service that listens whether emergency affordances
are necessary.
If the they are needed, it adds an option to the
global actions dialog that directly launches the
emergency call and also adds a long-press listener
to the keyguard emergency button.
Test: adb shell settings put global force_emergency_affordance 1 && adb shell settings put global emergency_affordance_number 111112
Bug: 30404490
Change-Id: Ib96a15da2ef4b568a8d77140ebca6aa6f20f5ddb
