Also don't show smart actions for selections in text with unsupported
characters.
Bug: 116321860
Test: runtest -x cts/tests/tests/text/src/android/text/util/cts/LinkifyTest.java
Change-Id: Ib2ee544b5783234fba8ee2f93adf0b36b039520f
Merged-In: Ib2ee544b5783234fba8ee2f93adf0b36b039520f
ActivityManagerService#isAppForeground now checks if the caller has the
permission to view if an app is in the foreground.
Bug: 115384617
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.ActivityManagerTest#testIsAppInForegroundNormal
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.ActivityManagerTest#testIsAppInForegroundMalicious
Change-Id: I9602c89b2d40036e525c38960a08326dc74c6682
The path-permission element offers prefix or regex style matching of
paths, but most providers internally use UriMatcher to decide what
to do with an incoming Uri.
This causes trouble because UriMatcher uses Uri.getPathSegments(),
which quietly ignores "empty" paths. Consider this example:
<path-permission android:pathPrefix="/private" ... />
uriMatcher.addURI("com.example", "/private", CODE_PRIVATE);
content://com.example//private
The Uri above will pass the security check, since it's not
technically a prefix match. But the UriMatcher will then match it
as CODE_PRIVATE, since it ignores the "//" zero-length path.
Since we can't safely change the behavior of either path-permission
or UriMatcher, we're left with recovering these shady paths by
trimming away zero-length paths.
Bug: 112555574
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Change-Id: Ibadbfa4fc904ec54780c8102958735b03293fb9a
Make sure the number of entries written by Parcel#writeMapInternal
matches the size written. If a mismatch were allowed, an exploitable
scenario could occur where the data read from the Parcel would not
match the data written.
Fixes: 112859604
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsOsTestCases -t android.os.cts.ParcelTest
Change-Id: I325d08a8b66b6e80fe76501359c41b6656848607
Merged-In: I325d08a8b66b6e80fe76501359c41b6656848607
The crash was introduced by Ib66ef392c19c937718e7101f6d48fac3abe51ad0
The root cause of the crashing is requesting out-of-line access for the
horizontal width. This invalid access is silently ignored by
TextLine#measure() method but new implementation end up with out of
bounds access.
To makes behavior as old implementation, calling getHorizontal instead
of accessing measured result array.
Bug: 78464361, 111580019
Test: Manually done
Change-Id: I5c5778718f6b397adbb1e4f2cf95e9f635f6e5c8
(cherry picked from commit 960647d582)
Merged-In: I5c5778718f6b397adbb1e4f2cf95e9f635f6e5c8
The crash was introduced by Ib66ef392c19c937718e7101f6d48fac3abe51ad0
The root cause of the crashing is requesting out-of-line access for the
horizontal width. This invalid access is silently ignored by
TextLine#measure() method but new implementation end up with out of
bounds access.
To makes behavior as old implementation, calling getHorizontal instead
of accessing measured result array.
Bug: 78464361, 111580019
Test: Manually done
Change-Id: I5c5778718f6b397adbb1e4f2cf95e9f635f6e5c8
(cherry picked from commit 960647d582)
Merged-In: I5c5778718f6b397adbb1e4f2cf95e9f635f6e5c8
Developers often accept selection clauses from untrusted code, and
SQLiteQueryBuilder already supports a "strict" mode to help catch
SQL injection attacks. This change extends the builder to support
update() and delete() calls, so that we can help secure those
selection clauses too.
Bug: 111085900
Test: atest packages/providers/DownloadProvider/tests/
Test: atest cts/tests/app/src/android/app/cts/DownloadManagerTest.java
Test: atest cts/tests/tests/database/src/android/database/sqlite/cts/SQLiteQueryBuilderTest.java
Change-Id: Ib4fc8400f184755ee7e971ab5f2095186341730c
Merged-In: Ib4fc8400f184755ee7e971ab5f2095186341730c
SQLiteQueryBuilder has a setStrict() mode which can be used to
detect SQL attacks from untrusted sources, which it does by running
each query twice: once with an extra set of parentheses, and if that
succeeds, it runs the original query verbatim.
This sadly doesn't catch inputs of the type "1=1) OR (1=1", which
creates valid statements for both tests above, but the final executed
query ends up leaking data due to SQLite operator precedence.
Instead, we need to continue compiling both variants, but we need
to execute the query with the additional parentheses to ensure
data won't be leaked.
Test: atest cts/tests/tests/database/src/android/database/sqlite/cts/SQLiteQueryBuilderTest.java
Bug: 111085900
Change-Id: I6e8746fa48f9de13adae37d2990de11c9c585381
Merged-In: I6e8746fa48f9de13adae37d2990de11c9c585381
Developers often accept selection clauses from untrusted code, and
SQLiteQueryBuilder already supports a "strict" mode to help catch
SQL injection attacks. This change extends the builder to support
update() and delete() calls, so that we can help secure those
selection clauses too.
Bug: 111085900
Test: atest packages/providers/DownloadProvider/tests/
Test: atest cts/tests/app/src/android/app/cts/DownloadManagerTest.java
Test: atest cts/tests/tests/database/src/android/database/sqlite/cts/SQLiteQueryBuilderTest.java
Change-Id: Ib4fc8400f184755ee7e971ab5f2095186341730c
Merged-In: Ib4fc8400f184755ee7e971ab5f2095186341730c
SQLiteQueryBuilder has a setStrict() mode which can be used to
detect SQL attacks from untrusted sources, which it does by running
each query twice: once with an extra set of parentheses, and if that
succeeds, it runs the original query verbatim.
This sadly doesn't catch inputs of the type "1=1) OR (1=1", which
creates valid statements for both tests above, but the final executed
query ends up leaking data due to SQLite operator precedence.
Instead, we need to continue compiling both variants, but we need
to execute the query with the additional parentheses to ensure
data won't be leaked.
Test: atest cts/tests/tests/database/src/android/database/sqlite/cts/SQLiteQueryBuilderTest.java
Bug: 111085900
Change-Id: I6e8746fa48f9de13adae37d2990de11c9c585381
Merged-In: I6e8746fa48f9de13adae37d2990de11c9c585381
* changes:
[automerger] Optimise the hit test algorithm am: 71ecf5bd5c am: 42eaa8f932 am: a72cb45f89
[automerger] Optimise the hit test algorithm am: 71ecf5bd5c am: 42eaa8f932
[automerger] Optimise the hit test algorithm am: 71ecf5bd5c
Optimise the hit test algorithm
* changes:
[automerger] Optimise the hit test algorithm am: 71ecf5bd5c am: 42eaa8f932
[automerger] Optimise the hit test algorithm am: 71ecf5bd5c
Optimise the hit test algorithm