Root cause: systemui run as user 0 service to handle all of users'
notifications. And, the users can user the copy/cut/paste
functionality.
Solution: To crate @hide API in TextView let SystemUI to mark the
TextView instance should check if the power of
INTERACT_ACROSS_USER_FULL is needed to be restricted.
e.x. Keyguard password textview/Notificaiton entries
Bug: 123232892
Test: manual test
Reference: I6d11e4d6a84570bc2991a8552349e8b216b0d139
Reference: Ibabe13e5b85e5bb91f9f8af6ec07c395c25c4393
Reference: I975baa748c821538e5a733bb98a33ac609bf40a7
Change-Id: I6d11e4d6a84570bc2991a8552349e8b216b0d139
Merged-In: Ie3daecd1e8fc2f7fdf37baeb5979da9f2e0b3937
Merged-In: I6d11e4d6a84570bc2991a8552349e8b216b0d139
Do not compute outside given range in TextLine
This is second attempt of I646851973b3816bf9ba32dfe26748c0345a5a081
which breaks various layout test on application.
The empty string must be also handled by the TextLine since it
retrieves the default line height from the empty string.
Bug: 140632678
Test: StaticLayoutTest
Test: Manually done
Change-Id: I7089ed9b711dddd7de2b27c9c2fa0fb4cb53a735
Enable stricter SQLiteQueryBuilder options.
Malicious callers can leak side-channel information by using
subqueries in any untrusted inputs where SQLite allows "expr" values.
This change starts using setStrictColumns() and setStrictGrammar()
on SQLiteQueryBuilder to block this class of attacks. This means we
now need to define the projection mapping of valid columns, which
consists of both the columns defined in the public API and columns
read internally by DownloadInfo.Reader.
We're okay growing sAppReadableColumnsSet like this, since we're
relying on our trusted WHERE clause to filter away any rows that
don't belong to the calling UID.
Remove the legacy Lexer code, since we're now internally relying on
the robust and well-tested SQLiteTokenizer logic.
Bug: 135270103, 135269143
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppTestCases -t android.app.cts.DownloadManagerTest
Change-Id: Iec1e8ce18dc4a9564318e0473d9d3863c8c2988a
Strict SQLiteQueryBuilder needs to be stricter.
Malicious callers can leak side-channel information by using
subqueries in any untrusted inputs where SQLite allows "expr" values.
This change offers setStrictGrammar() to prevent this by outright
blocking subqueries in WHERE and HAVING clauses, and by requiring
that GROUP BY and ORDER BY clauses be composed only of valid columns.
This change also offers setStrictColumns() to require that all
untrusted column names are valid, such as those in ContentValues.
Relaxes to always allow aggregation operators on returned columns,
since untrusted callers can always calculate these manually.
Bug: 135270103, 135269143
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsDatabaseTestCases -t android.database.sqlite.cts.SQLiteQueryBuilderTest
Change-Id: I6290afd19c966a8bdca71c377c88210d921a9f25
The CL fixes a crash in Layout.primaryIsTrailingPreviousAllLineOffsets.
The crash was happening when the method was called for a line beginning
with an empty bidi run. This could happen, for example, for empty text -
I was unable to find any other case. The CL improves the existing test
for the method with this case, which was previously crashing.
The CL also fixes a potential crash in getLineHorizontals. However, this
bug could never happen as in the current code path clamped is always
false (and kept as parameter for parity with getHorizontal).
Bug: 135444178
Bug: 78464361
Test: atest FrameworksCoreTests:android.text.LayoutTest\#testPrimaryIsTrailingPrevious
Change-Id: I47157abe1d74675884734e3810628a566e40c1b4
(cherry picked from commit 7ad499d007)
The CL fixes a crash in Layout.primaryIsTrailingPreviousAllLineOffsets.
The crash was happening when the method was called for a line beginning
with an empty bidi run. This could happen, for example, for empty text -
I was unable to find any other case. The CL improves the existing test
for the method with this case, which was previously crashing.
The CL also fixes a potential crash in getLineHorizontals. However, this
bug could never happen as in the current code path clamped is always
false (and kept as parameter for parity with getHorizontal).
Bug: 135444178
Bug: 78464361
Test: atest FrameworksCoreTests:android.text.LayoutTest\#testPrimaryIsTrailingPrevious
Change-Id: I47157abe1d74675884734e3810628a566e40c1b4
(cherry picked from commit 7ad499d007)
This prevents any object data from being accidentally overwritten by the
exception, which could cause unexpected malformed objects to be sent
across the transaction.
Test: atest CtsOsTestCases:ParcelTest#testExceptionOverwritesObject
Bug: 34175893
Change-Id: Iaf80a0ad711762992b8ae60f76d861c97a403013
Merged-In: Iaf80a0ad711762992b8ae60f76d861c97a403013
Test: bit CtsViewTestCases:android.view.textclassifier.cts.TextClassificationManagerTest
bit FrameworksCoreTests:android.widget.TextViewActivityTest
bit FrameworksCoreTests:android.widget.TextViewActivityMoutseTest
Bug: 120866126
Bug: 62745625
Merged-In: I360250a5c2a92d09c8d8f559b51c74f490f70c2c
Change-Id: I360250a5c2a92d09c8d8f559b51c74f490f70c2c
Also don't show smart actions for selections in text with unsupported
characters.
Bug: 116321860
Test: runtest -x cts/tests/tests/text/src/android/text/util/cts/LinkifyTest.java
Change-Id: Ib2ee544b5783234fba8ee2f93adf0b36b039520f
Merged-In: Ib2ee544b5783234fba8ee2f93adf0b36b039520f
Also don't show smart actions for selections in text with unsupported
characters.
Bug: 116321860
Test: runtest -x cts/tests/tests/text/src/android/text/util/cts/LinkifyTest.java
Change-Id: Id271cab8aef6b9b13ef17f1a8654c7616f75cf13
ActivityManagerService#isAppForeground now checks if the caller has the
permission to view if an app is in the foreground.
Bug: 115384617
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.ActivityManagerTest#testIsAppInForegroundNormal
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityTestCases -t android.security.cts.ActivityManagerTest#testIsAppInForegroundMalicious
Change-Id: I9602c89b2d40036e525c38960a08326dc74c6682
By requiring an explicit default setting, it eliminates all ambiguous
states where a disambiguation would normally be shown. With this
change in place, at no point should a disambiguation be shown.
Test: manual
Bug: 111603898
Change-Id: Ib32dafbd3c6fcbe11186dc8ecab6b09c9b734067
Merged-In: Id39fdf700ed4ef08ebbc333b5452223430ac2e48
The path-permission element offers prefix or regex style matching of
paths, but most providers internally use UriMatcher to decide what
to do with an incoming Uri.
This causes trouble because UriMatcher uses Uri.getPathSegments(),
which quietly ignores "empty" paths. Consider this example:
<path-permission android:pathPrefix="/private" ... />
uriMatcher.addURI("com.example", "/private", CODE_PRIVATE);
content://com.example//private
The Uri above will pass the security check, since it's not
technically a prefix match. But the UriMatcher will then match it
as CODE_PRIVATE, since it ignores the "//" zero-length path.
Since we can't safely change the behavior of either path-permission
or UriMatcher, we're left with recovering these shady paths by
trimming away zero-length paths.
Bug: 112555574
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Change-Id: Ibadbfa4fc904ec54780c8102958735b03293fb9a
The path-permission element offers prefix or regex style matching of
paths, but most providers internally use UriMatcher to decide what
to do with an incoming Uri.
This causes trouble because UriMatcher uses Uri.getPathSegments(),
which quietly ignores "empty" paths. Consider this example:
<path-permission android:pathPrefix="/private" ... />
uriMatcher.addURI("com.example", "/private", CODE_PRIVATE);
content://com.example//private
The Uri above will pass the security check, since it's not
technically a prefix match. But the UriMatcher will then match it
as CODE_PRIVATE, since it ignores the "//" zero-length path.
Since we can't safely change the behavior of either path-permission
or UriMatcher, we're left with recovering these shady paths by
trimming away zero-length paths.
Bug: 112555574
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Change-Id: Ibadbfa4fc904ec54780c8102958735b03293fb9a
Make sure the number of entries written by Parcel#writeMapInternal
matches the size written. If a mismatch were allowed, an exploitable
scenario could occur where the data read from the Parcel would not
match the data written.
Fixes: 112859604
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsOsTestCases -t android.os.cts.ParcelTest
Change-Id: I325d08a8b66b6e80fe76501359c41b6656848607
Merged-In: I325d08a8b66b6e80fe76501359c41b6656848607
