Merge "Fix seccomp filter set up in zygote"
am: 29d32fb55b
Change-Id: Ie2a052905ae6703b45c951c852aa786c41a8a7f9
This commit is contained in:
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void SetUpSeccompFilter(uid_t uid) {
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}
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// Apply system or app filter based on uid.
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if (getuid() >= AID_APP_START) {
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if (uid >= AID_APP_START) {
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set_app_seccomp_filter();
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} else {
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set_system_seccomp_filter();
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@@ -619,11 +619,6 @@ static pid_t ForkAndSpecializeCommon(JNIEnv* env, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, jintArra
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fail_fn(CREATE_ERROR("sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, { SIGCHLD }) failed: %s", strerror(errno)));
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}
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// Must be called when the new process still has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The other alternative is to
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// call prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1) afterward, but that breaks SELinux domain transition (see
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// b/71859146).
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SetUpSeccompFilter(uid);
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// Keep capabilities across UID change, unless we're staying root.
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if (uid != 0) {
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if (!EnableKeepCapabilities(&error_msg)) {
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@@ -697,6 +692,13 @@ static pid_t ForkAndSpecializeCommon(JNIEnv* env, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, jintArra
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fail_fn(CREATE_ERROR("setresgid(%d) failed: %s", gid, strerror(errno)));
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}
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// Must be called when the new process still has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, in this case, before changing
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// uid from 0, which clears capabilities. The other alternative is to call
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// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1) afterward, but that breaks SELinux domain transition (see
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// b/71859146). As the result, privileged syscalls used below still need to be accessible in
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// app process.
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SetUpSeccompFilter(uid);
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rc = setresuid(uid, uid, uid);
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if (rc == -1) {
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fail_fn(CREATE_ERROR("setresuid(%d) failed: %s", uid, strerror(errno)));
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